Total compensation for state and local government workers in the United States rose ten percent faster than that for civilian workers between 1982 and 1993. These statistics have sparked a public policy debate on the role of public sector pay increases in contributing to the fiscal problems of state and local governments during this period,' and more generally on compensation policy in the public sector.1 Much of this debate has proceeded without regard to a voluminous literature In labor economics, beginning with Smith (1977) and surveyed by Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1986) , that has estimated the pay premium associated with working in the public rather than the private sector. The recent increase in average public sector compensation is particularly difficult to interpret in light of the well-documented rise in the labor market returns to schooling during the 1 980s, and the greater concentration of highly-educated workers in state and local government than in the private sector.
Most of the previous research on pay differentials between the public and private sectors focuses on the 1960s and 1970s, a period when public sector employment grew rapidly and unions and collective bargaining diffused in the public sector. Ehrenberg and Smith (1994) summarize these studies as suggesting a public sector wage premium for women, and a small wage penalty for men. The most recent comparison of public and private sector wages, by Katz and Krueger (1991) , tracks the evolution of relative wages during the 1979-1988 period. That study 'Examples of recent policy discussions focusing on this issue include Cox and Brunelli (1992) , who attribute fiscal stress to rising public sector pay, and Beiman and Heyward (1992) , who argue that wages in the public sector are insignificantly different from those in the private sector.
contrasts the state and local government wage premium for workers with different educational attainments. It finds that poorly-educated workers enjoyed a growing public sector wage premium during the 1980s, while better-educated workers faced a shrinking public sector premium. These findings, which motivate the current study, underscore the importance of dlsaggregation In considering relative public and private sector wages. This paper presents new evidence on the evolution of the state and local government wage premium for different categories of workers during the last decade.
We employ quantlle regression techniques to explore the distribution of relative wages in the two sectors. We find that while the level of the public sector wage premium varies significantly as one moves across quantiles of the conditional wage distribution, the change in the public sector wage premium is relatively insensitive to the choice of quantile. This paper Is divided into four sections. SectIon one summarizes recent trends in wages and compensation In state and local government and the private sector. It uses data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to confirm previous estimates of the average public sector wage premium, for men and women with different levels of human capital. It also discusses the intertemporal consistency problems that are created by the 1992 change In the CPS questions related to education.
Section two presents quantlie regression evidence on both the level of, and change In, the public sector wage premium. The empirical results suggest that different parts of the relative wage dIstrIbution have evolved In different ways during 3 the last two decades, and provide further insight on the experience of workers with various levels of human capital. Section three reports alternative estimates of the public sector wage premium, based on comparisons of workers in narrowly-defined occupations with similar Job responsibilities in both sectors. Although there are substantial disparities in the estimated public sector premia in different occupations.
the broad patterns are consistent with our earlier findings. A brief conclusion suggests a number of directions for further work. Two data sources are widely used to compare the relative earnings of workers in state and local government and the private sector. These are the Employer Cost Index (ECU. which is compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and has included information on total compensation of state and local government employees for the period since 1982, and the Current Population Survey (CR5), which contains individual-level information on the wages and salaries of workers in state and local government as well as the private sector.2 This section begins by describing the relative compensation trends shown by the ECI data. The primary limitation of the ECI is that it is not possible to control for worker characteristics in comparing wages and benefits In the two sectors. The remainder of this section, and this paper, therefore 2We combine state and local government employees into a single sector. in 1991, states employed 4.4% (5.4%) of employed men (women), while localities accounted for 7.6% (11.9%). The higher share of female local employees largely reflects local employment of primary and secondary teachers. relies on CPS data to compare the relative public and private sector wages of workers with similar characteristics.
RelatIve Compensation Data from the Emolovment Cost Index
The BLS Employment Cost Index measures total compensation, wages plus the cost of fringe benefits, for workers in the public and private sectors. These data can be used to compare the average levels of compensation in the two sectors at a point
In time, or to compare the relative growth rates over time in compensation for a fixed occupational mix of workers. Even within these broad occupational categories, however, both average 3More than half of state and local government employees are employed in the production of educational services. Teachers and most other workers in the education sector are white collar employees. Police, fire, and sanitation workers are classified as service workers. 5 compensation and average wage and salary for state and local employees exceed the comparable magnitudes for private sector workers. The absolute disparitIes are greatest for white collar and servIce employees, who receive an average of $8.00 and $8.50 in additional compensation In the public sector. The percentage difference In compensation Is greatest for servIce workers, for whom total public sector compensation Is nearly twice that in the private sector.
ECI data are available since 1982. They show that the index of total compensation for private sector workers rose 60.4%, or at a compound annual growth rate of 4.3%. between June 1982 and June 1993. For state and local government employees, the corresponding increase in compensation was 76.2%, which corresponds to an annual growth rate of 5.1%. Most of the difference in compensation growth rates occurred during the mld-1980s.
The primary advantage of ECI data, relative to information in the CPS. is that it provides information on fringe benefits as well as wages and salaries. In 1993.
beneflt costs averaged 43.8% of wage costs for public sector workers, and 40.3% for those In the private sector. Between 1982 and 1993, wages and salaries grew 69.2% in the public sector, and 52.2% in the private sector. Thus, both wage and non-wage compensation increased faster for public sector than private sector workers.
These summary measures nevertheless suggest that focusing exclusively on the evolution of relative wage levels, as we do below, should capture the broad trends in relative compensation in the two sectors. 
PublIc Sector Waoe Premia in the CPS Data
We follow In the tradition of Smith (1977) and estimate the wage premium associated with state and local government employment by fitting wage equations on CPS data.' Our wage equation relates the logarithm of an individual's hourly wage, ln(wft), to a set of individual characteristics (;)that can affect marginal productivity, and an indicator variable (SLGOV) for working in the public sector:
In w, XJ3, + SLGOV,.6, + c,.
(1)
The set of individual characteristics includes education, experience (age -education. 6), marital status, race, residence in an SMSA, as well as an indicator variable for part-time employment. We allow education to affect wages through a set of four categorical variables (EDUC) for number of years of schooling, corresponding to less than twelve years, thirteen to fifteen years, sixteen years, which typically corresponds to completing college, and more than sixteen years. The omitted category is twelve years of schooling, which typically corresponds to completing high school. The wage equajion includes linear, quadratic, cubic, and quartic powers of experience. In some equations, we also include a set of control variables for ten broad occupational 'Moore and Newman (1991) summarIze this literature, and also note that since wage equations estimated on Individual data typically lack Information on precise job characteristics, there may be omitted factors, such as the riskiness of some types of public sector jobs, that contribute to wage differentials. classifications, such as managerial and technical, sales, or crafts.'
We estimate (1) usIng data from the merged outgoIng rotation groups In the CPS for the years 1979-1992. We exclude self-employed IndivIduals from our analysis, because It is difficult to measure their wage rates. We also exclude federal government employees, because they are neither private sector nor state and local government employees.e We estimate equation (1) separately for men and women.
Changes in the CPS questIonnaire with respect to education, introduced beginning with the 1992 survey, make it impossible to estimate the same wage equation before and after 1991. Prior to 1992, the CPS question about educational attainment asked respondents about the number of years that they had attended school, and whether the final year of schooling had been completed. Beginning with the 1992 survey, the CPS questions focused on the respondent's highest grade completed, with additional questions designed to collect information on degrees 'The set of variables included In this wage equation is similar to that in Krueger (1991, 1992) , although our approach is somewhat different. They estimate separate wage equations for workers in the public and private sectors, and then predict average wages In each sector for hypothetical workers with fixed characteristics. We estimate a single wage equation each year for all men, and all women, and impose the same coefficient vector fl for the private and public sectors up to a year-specific shift parameter, 6. This procedure yields a parametric estimate of the wage premium associated with public sector employment. We further disaggregate this premium, in some cases, Into that part attributable to differences In the returns to schooling and experience across sectors. We always constrain the coefficients on other individual characteristics to be equal across sectors.
'if we include federal empioyees, and allow a separate average wage premium for these workers, our results on the relative wages of state-local government and private sector employees are not affected. The average wage premium for federal workers, relative to private sector workers, is positive. These survey changes Imply an inconsistent classification of Individuals across the five categorical variables for educational attainment between 1992 and previous years. This inconsistency will also affect the measurement of experience, which is defined as (age -schooling -6). In spite of these problems, we estimate the analogue of equation (1) on the 1992 data, and we do not find any evidence of a discontinuity in the estimated public sector wage premium between 1991 and 1992. The problem of intertemporal inconsistency, however, leads us to focus on the 1979-1991 period when we disaggregate the state and local government wage premium by education and experience. Equation (1) allows the premium for state and local government employees (6k), as well as other coefficients in the wage equation, to vary across years. Figure 1 a plots the values of 6 from the estimated wage equations for men for the [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] period. The other coefficients from the estimated wage equations, which are similar to those in other studies using CPS data, are not reported. Figure 1 shows two curves, one corresponding to estimates of (1) The premia shown In FIgure 1 a contrast with the earlier estimates based on differences in average wages in the Employment Cost Index. In the early 1 990s. the CI'S data show rough parity between the characteristic-controlled wages of men employed in the public and private sectors. The estimates of J with and without occupational controls display a similar pattern of compression in the differences between public and private sector pay. While the estimates without occupation controls suggest that public sector male workers earned 11.5% less than their private sector counterparts In 1980, they suggest earnings of only 1.9% less in 1992. With occupational controls, the absolute difference narrows, with a change from a 6.6% deficit (1979) to a 0.3% premIum (1992).
Figure lb shows the analogous estimates of the year-by-year wage premium
We have disaggregated public sector workers into state employees and local government employees. In 1979, men who worked for local governments earned 2.9% (0.8 standard error) less than those who worked for state governments. This differential declined over the 1979-1991 period, to a local government penalty of 0.6% (0.9) by 1991. For women, local governments also pay less well than state governments. The pay penalty changes from 3.7% In 1979 to 4.2% in 1991.
for women employed in state and local government. Both the level of the wage premium, and the time pattern of this premium, are very different than those for men In Figure la . Without occupational controls, the public sector appears to pay a oremlum of between three and five percent to women employees during this period.
With occupational controls, the average wage premium Is statistically indistinguishable from zero in the early 1 980s and early 1 990s, although it rises slightly, to a premium of one and a half percent, In the mid-1980s. Katz and Krueger (1991) found substantial differences between the public sector wage premia for those with high school and college degrees. We present further evidence on the link between worker attributes and the public sector wage premium by interacting the set of indicator variables for five ranges of educational attainment (EDUC,J with the Indicator variable for working in the state and local sector. This yields the equation: S In w1 = ,çp, + E SLGOV,sEDUC*6, + €,.
.3 Public Sector Waae Premia Stratified by Educational Attainment
( 2) The set of coefficients 5,1 measure the public sector wage premium for each educational group.
To avoid the problems of intertemporal inconsistency In the CPS education variable between 1992 and earlier years, we estimate equation (2) Although high school educated women did not face the public sector pay penalty that high school educated men faced at the end of the 1970s, they did share in their°K atz and Krueger (1991) limIt their analysis to those with either 12 years or at least 16 years of schooling. They report relatively little change, or a slight Increase, in the public sector pay penalty for men with college or post-college education during the 1979-1987 period. Table 2 shows there are differences in the relative wage experience of those with Just 16, and more than 16, years of schooling.
relative public sector wage appreciation. For highly-educated women, the public sector wage premium of the late 1 970s largely disappeared by 1991. A woman with a college degree was predicted to earn 9.2% more In the public than In the private sector In 1979, but no more In 1991. For women with post-college educatIon, the estimated wage premium declined from 14.4% to 3.4%.
Exoiprina Public and Private Sector Wace Distributions
The recent decline in the real wages of workers with relatively low skill levels, documented for example by Bound and Johnson (1992) , Katz and Murphy (1992) .
and Murphy and Welch (1992) , has heightened interest in the lower tails of the both the private and public sector wage distributions in the United States. The possibility that political factors constrain the pay of highly-skilled public sector employees, which is discussed by Joskow, Rose. and Shephard (1993) and Ritchie and Gold (1992) , suggests the value of examining the upper tails of the distributions as well. Krueger (1991, 1992 ) discuss a number of factors that may contribute to greater rigidity overtime, as well as less dispersion at a point in time, in public sector wages than their private sector counterparts. in this section, we present new evidence on the distribution of relative wages in the public and private sectors.
There are three sources of differences in the public and private sector wage distributions: differences in the distributions of worker characteristics in the two sectors, differences In the returns to various worker charateristics across sectors, and 13 differences In the distributions of unexplained wage residuals across sectors)° To explore the distribution of human capital attributes In the two sectors, we computed the distribution of predicted wages in each sector using the coefficients from a wage equation estimated only for private sector employees in 1991. These distributions for men and women are shown In Figure 2 . For both men and women, the distribution of predicted hourly wages In the public sector is right-shifted relative to the analogous private sector wage distribution, Indicating that there are proportionally more workers with high levels of education and experience in the pubilc than in the private sector.
The regression coefficients in Table 2 describe the average pubiic sector wage premium for individuals with different leveis of education. They do not consider the possibility that the distribution of actual wages around their predicted values differs across sectors. in fact, both the unconditional and conditional wage distributions in the public sector are more compressed than those in the private sector. To Illustrate this, we estimated separate wage equations for public and private sector workers, without occupational controls, using the 1979 and 1991 CPS data sets. The estimates for men show that for 1991, o = .440, while u = .410. For women, the analogous estimates are = .414 and g = .387. There has been relatively little change in the relative dispersion of the public and private sector wage distributions for men, although there Is some evidence of growing private relative to '°Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) decompose changes in the wage distribution Into these three components. 14 public sector dispersion for women."
Estimating the public sector wage premium is complicated by the presence of different 'ariances in the wage distributions in the public and private sectors. To Illustrate this, consider a case in which the mean and median wages in the two sectors, conditional on worker attributes, are Identical, but the private sector has greater wage dispersion. While comparisons of the mean or median conditional wage will show no public sector premium, comparisons of higher quantiies will show a public sector pay penalty, while lower quantiles will show a public sector premium.
Similar concerns about differences in the variance of conditional wage distributions between the union and non-union sectors led Chamberlain (1994) to study the union wage premium at various quantiles. Buchinsky (1994a,b} has developed related arguments for applying quantile-based methods to studying the returns to education and the changing distribution of private sector wages more generally. We follow this approach and estimate quantiie regression models corresponding to equations (1) and (2) above.
We assume that the qth quantiie of the conditional wage distribution is a linear function of individual attributes (X1j:
Quanç( In w, / )t') = + SLGOV*64,. with OLS estimates, are shown in Table 3 . The estimated private sector wage premium for men, estimated by median regression, is about two percent greater than that estimated by ordinary least squares. At q = .10. the estimated private sector premium for the early 1 980s is negligible, even though the OLS estimates suggest an 11 % wage disparity between state and local government and the private sector.
Similarly, the results for q = .90 show a public sector wage disadvantage of more than twenty percent in the early 1 980s, declining to eight percent by 1991. In most years.
the absolute difference between the wage premium estimated with median regression and that with q = .90 Is smaller than that between the median regression and q = .10.
The quantile regression results for women are similar to those for men. The median regression results are similar to the least squares coefficients, and the level of the estimated public sector wage premIum depends on the value of q, but the time series pattern of wage premia Is similar for most quantiles. There Is one exception:
'2Chamberlaln (1994) proposes an alternative minImum-distance estimator for quantile regression models, which requires stratifying the data Into cells, computing cell quantiles, and then fitting a conditional quantile function to these cell quantlles. Where feasible, we estimated the quantlie regression models presented below by this method, with results quite similar to those we report, which are based on the linear programming algorithm. The quantile regression results suggest two findings. First, the yf of the estimated public sector wage premium is sensitive to the choice of quantile. There Is a much smaller penalty associated with working in the public sector at low than at high quántiles. The pattern of quantlie regression coefficients for the state and local wage premium resembles Chamberlain's (1994) findings for union wage effects, with larger positive effects at lower quantiles. Second, in spite of our finding regarding the level of the public sector pay premium, however, the time series oattem of state and local government wage premla from the quantile regressions tracks that from the least squares regressions very closely, regardless of which value of q we choose.
We do not report standard errors for each of the coefficient estimates in Table   3 , because these standard errors are roughly constant from year to year for each quantile. We do present the average of the twelve estimated standard errors for each set of quantile coefficients.'3 These standard errors are computed from the analytic "In a typical column in Table 3 , more than half of the estimated year-specific standard errors equal the average standard error reported In the bottom row. Several recent studies, for example Rogers (1992) , have considered the estimation of quantile regression standard errors, and compared the performance of this analytical procedure with alternatives such as bootstrap estimation. We also calculated bootstrap standard errors for some of our quantlie coefficient estimates. Table 4 reports the 6 coefficients, and both sets of standard errors, for the 1979 and 1991 samples. The results show that the analytic and bootstrap standard errors are very similar for both years. In no case do the two approaches yield differences in the estimated standard errors of more than .001, which corresponds to less than a 25% difference for virtually all coefficients.
There remains a question of whether our quantile regression results are solely driven by differences in conditional variances across sectors. Applying a result In Chamberlain (1994) , If the conditional log wage distributIons for the private and public sectors are respectively N(XI8V, o,,) and N(6 + Xhfi1 oj, then the estimated state and local wage premium at the qth quantile will equalS + X,(8 -fl,,,) + q'(o -c,,j. We also apply quantile methods to study the public sector wage premium conditional on various levels of educational attainment, and conditional on various levels of experience. The results of estimating equation (2) by quantile methods are presented in Table 5 . The results show that there is relatively little difference across quantiles In the 1979-91 chanae in the public sector premium. The level of the public sector wage premium, however, differs across quantiles in the same way as in Table   3 . For those with less than a high school degree, there are also differences in the changes in the wage premla at different quantiles, but there is no apparent pattern.
For those at high quantiles (q .90), the increase In the public sector premium is smaller than that for others in the distribution.
The lower panel of Table 5 presents results for women analogous to those in the upper panel for men. The most striking examples of differences in the chance In the public sector premium as we vary the quantile value are found for women with college or post-graduate degrees. For those with a college degree, the public sector pay premium in the 10th percentile narrowed from 13.6% (1979) to 10.3% (1991).
For those In the 90th percentile, however, the pay penalty expanded substantially, 19 from -1.4% in 1979 to -11.0% In 1991. A similar pattern Is observed for those with post-graduate degrees.
We also explored the distribution of public sector wage premia for workers with different levels of experience. Instead of the quartlc equation In experience, which Is Included In the ; matrix of equatIons (1) and (2) In w, = X1p, + ESLGOV,*EXPER,s8, + E.
(5) Table 6 shows the results of estimating (5) by quantile regression. For men, there is no evidence that the level of the public sector wage prenlia depends significantly on experience, or that the pattern of such premia across experience categories changed substantially during the 1 980s. For women, however, the results do suggest that those with more experience fared relatively better than those who were recently hired in the public sector. For female employees with less than ten years of experience, the public sector pay premium narrowed from 5.5% to 1.8% between 1979 and 1991. For those with more than thirty years of experience, the premium grew from 7.2% to 8.5%. There Is some evidence, based on comparison 20 of various quantiie results, that high-experience women at the bottom of the conditional wage distribution recorded larger relative gains than those elsewhere In the distributIon. For men, there is some evidence that the change in the public sector premium, conditional on experience, depended on their location In the conditional wage distribution. For those with less than tenyears of experience, the public sector pay premium grew much more for those near the top of the wage dIstribution than those at lower strata.
Public and Private Sector Waces in Soecific OccuDatlons
Our analysIs so far has compared Individuals with similar human capital attributes, but we have not considered occupational characteristics, such as the riskiness of some public safety jobs, that might lead to a pay differentials for public sector work. To address such differences, in this section we present detailed comparisons of relative public and private sector wages for several occupational categories with substantial employment in both sectors.
We begin by pooling adjacent years of CPS data, for 1979/80 and 1990/91.
to increase our effective sample size.'5 For each of these data sets, we then select respondents in the various occupational categories, estimate a wage equation similar '5Given the CPS sampling pattern, which surveys Individuals for four consecutive months, leaves them out of the survey for eight months, and then includes them again for another four months, half of the Individuals who participate In the survey in a given month of one year will will also be surveyed In the same month the next year.
To avoid spurious double-counting of these individuals, we exclude the 1980 responses of such Individuals in our 1979/80 data set, and the 1990 responses of such Individuals in our 1990/91 data set.
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to (1) Is clouded, however, by the difficulty of comparing public and private schools.
Because private schools may offer less difficult work environments than public schools, part of the estimated public sector premium may reflect differences in Job 22 characteristics. Private schools also typically require fewer credentials, beyond a college degree, than their public sector counterparts. For post-secondary teachers, we estimate a public sector pay premium of between six and seven percent In both data sets.
The lower panel of Table 7 presents parallel evidence for women employed in similar occupations in the public and private sectors. The results for both orderlies and cleaners confirm the earlier findings for men, and there is weak evidence, based on the results for cleaners, receptlonlsts, secretaries, and typists, of a growing public sector pay premium during this period. For nurses, a relatively high-skill occupation, we are not able to reject the null hypothesis of equal pay In the two sectors.
The results for female teachers differ somewhat from the results for men. For primary and secondary teachers, the point estimates suggest a substantial public sector pay premium, with weak evidence of a widening pay premium over the twelve years we consider. For post-secondary teachers, the estimates suggest that a substantial pay premium in 1979/80 largely disappeared by the end of our sample.
Conclusions
This paper presents new evidence on the evolution of the pay differential between state and local government and the private sector during the 1980s. It emphasizes changes In the distribution as well as the average level of this pay differential. For men, the results suggest that a substantial private sector premium at the beginning of the 1 980s was largely eradicated during the 1979-1992 period.
For women, there is little evidence of a change In the relationship between public and private sector wages. Most of this analysis has focused on wages and salaries, usIng data from the Current Population Survey.
We have not considered the potential selection biases that plague studies of inter-sectoral wage differences, whether between the public and private sectors orthe union and non-union sectors. This Is because we have not found variables that are likely to affect the probability of public sector employment, but not public sector wages, and that could consequently be used to identify selection models.
One natural avenue for extending this work would involve more detailed consideration of fringe benefits in the public and private sectors. Public sector workers are more likely to be covered by defined benefit pension plans, and are more likely to receive a number of other fringe benefits than their private sector counterparts. There is little systematic evidence, however, on how the value of such fringes for comDarable workers in the oublic and Drivate sectors has changed over time. Moreover, this paper has not considered the possibility that the availability of benefit packages changed in different ways for different classes of workers, for example those with college degrees versus those with high school degrees.
A second issue we have not explored Is the relative contribution of changes in public sector wages, and changes In prIvate sector wages, to movements in the public-private pay differential. Evidence from previous studies of private sector pay, however, suggests that much of the change In relative wages for those with low educational attainment Is due to worsening wage prospects in the private sector, 24 combined with less pronounced changes in public sector real wages.
A final direction for further analysis is the link between fiscal institutions, such as balanced budget amendments or expenditure limitation laws, and the evolution of public sector pay. Compensation costs account for nearly two thirds of expenditures by state and local governments in the United States, and to the extent such laws affect public spending, they are likely to affect wages and/or employment In the public sector. Research directed at this issue is currently underway. • Notes: Bootstrap standard errors are calculated using 20 iterations. Analytic standard errors are calculated using a kernel density function. Both procedures are performed using the STATA software package. 
